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TOWARDS A CHURCH-TURING-THESIS FOR
INFINITARY COMPUTATIONS
MERLIN CARL
Abstract. We consider the question whether there is an infini-
tary analogue of the Church-Turing-thesis. To this end, we argue
that there is an intuitive notion of transfinite computability and
build a canonical model, called Idealized Agent Machines (IAMs)
of this which will turn out to be equivalent in strength to the Or-
dinal Turing Machines defined by P. Koepke.
1. Introduction
Since [6], various generalizations of classical notions of computability
to the transfinite have been given and studied. The Infinite Time
Turing Machines (ITTMs) of Hamkins and Lewis generalized classical
Turing machines to transfinite working time. Ordinal Turing Machines
(OTMs) (see [15]) and Ordinal Register Machines (ORMs) further
generalized this by allowing working space of ordinal size. Recently, a
transfinite version of λ-calculus was introduced and studied [16]. It was
soon noted (see e.g. [2]) that the corresponding notion of computability
enjoys a certain stability under changes of the machine model: For
example, the sets of ordinals computable by OTMs and ORMs both
coincide with the constructible sets of ordinals.
A similar phenomenon is known from the models of classical com-
putability: Turing machines, register machines, recursive functions, λ
calculus etc. all lead to the same class of computable functions. In the
classical case, this is taken as evidence for what is known as the Church-
Turing-Thesis (CTT ), i.e. the claim that these functions are exactly
those computable in the ‘intuitive sense’ by a human being following a
rule without providing original input. This thesis plays an important
role in mathematics: It underlies, for example, the - to our knowledge
undisputed1 - view that Matiyasevich’s theorem [12] settles Hilbert’s
10th problem or that Turing’s work [18] settles the Entscheidungsprob-
lem. The study of recursive functions gets a lot of its attraction from
1It has been remarked that there are challenges to the claim that no physical
device could decide such questions, see e.g. [5] and [13]. However, here we are
interested in the capabilites of idealized computing agents. Whether what such
devices do can be considered to be a computation in the intuitive sense rather than
the observation of an incomputable process is a question we won’t consider here.
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this well-grounded belief that they coincide with this intuitive notion
of computability.
It therefore seems natural to ask whether something similar can be
said about transfinite models of computation, i.e. whether these mod-
els are mere ‘ordinalizations’ of the classical models or whether they
actually ‘model’ something, whether there is an intutive concept of
transfinite computability that is captured by these models: Hence, we
ask for an infinitary Church-Turing-thesis (ICTT ).
There seems to be some evidence that a satisfying ICTT should be
obtainable. Beside the stability of the corresponding notion of com-
putability mentioned above, it also became common to describe and
communicate the activity of such machines in rather informal terms:
Rather than writing an actual program for e.g. deciding number-
theoretical statements with an ITTM , it generally suffices to explain
that the machine will e.g. ‘search through the naturals for a witness’.
It usually soon becomes clear to someone with a basic familiarity with
these models that such a method can indeed be implemented and will
lead to the right results. Indeed, we will usually find such a ‘process
description’ much easier to grasp than an actual implementation. This
indicates that we indeed possess an intuitive understanding of what
these machines can do which is based on an understanding of infinite
processes rather than the formal definition of the machine. We aim
at connecting infinitary models of computation with a natural notion.
Here, ‘natural’ means that the notion can be obtained and described
independently from the models and that it is in some sense present
in normal (mathematical) thinking. Such a notion should furthermore
serve as a background thesis explaining the equivalence of the different
models, should (in analogy with the classical Church-Turing-thesis) jus-
tify the use of informal ’process descriptions’ to prove the existence of
formally specified programs and, ideally, allow mathematically fruitful
applications, similar to the role the classical CTT plays in e.g. Hilbert’s
10th problem.
In this work, we offer evidence for the claim that notions of trans-
finite computation are indeed naturally present in mathematical (and
possibly in everyday) thinking and that these notions are captured by
the transfinite machine models we mentioned.2 This will allow us to
formulate an ICTT .
This article is structured as follows: We begin by describing an ap-
proach of mathematical philosophy initiated by P. Kitcher [8], where
mathematical objects are modelled as mental constructions of idealized
agents. We also indicate that such idealizations are indeed present in
2To be precise, we will argue for this claim in the case of OTMs and ORMs.
Whether similar approaches are available for other models as well is briefly adressed
at the end of this paper.
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understanding mathematics. After that, we work towards a formal
notion of a computing transfinite agent, obtaining the notion of an
Idealized Agent Machine (IAM). Then, we show that the computa-
tional power of an IAM coincides with that of OTMs and ORMs
(which we will summarize under the term ‘standard models’ from now
on). Finally, we state (a candidate for) an ICTT and discuss whether
it meets the above requirements.
2. Idealized Constructions and Idealized Agents in
Mathematics
In this section, we briefly describe the view on the philosophy of
mathematics described in [Kitcher]. We use his account as a demon-
stration that the concept of transfinite agents can be motivated and has
arisen completely independent from our considerations. Furthermore,
we want to indicate how these views can be fruitful for infinitary com-
putations (and vice versa) and bring them into interaction. Finally, his
work serves us as a first introduction to the notion of idealized agents.
We will then demonstrate that this notion seems indeed to be present
in mathematical language and understanding.
2.1. Kitcher’s idealized-agents-view of mathematics. In a nut-
shell, Kitcher attempts to justify an empiricist account of mathemat-
ics by describing mathematics as an idealization of operations with
real-world objects like grouping them together, adding an object to a
pile of objects etc. These actions in themselves already are a kind of
primitive mathematics, limited by our practical constraints. What is
usually called mathematics is obtained by forming a theory of ideal-
ized operations in a similar way that, say, a theory of idealized gases is
formed: We abstract away from certain ‘complicating factors’ like e.g.
our factual incabability of indefinitely adding objects to a collection.
Mathematics is then the study of idealized operations, or, equivalently,
of the operations of idealized agents.
Upon reading this, one might wonder how this account is supposed
to make sense of the large parts of mathematics which, like axiomatic
set theory, deal with actual infinite objects. Kitcher’s reply to this is
simply that this is a mere question of the degree of idealization:
[8], p. 146: I see no bar to the supposition that the
sequence of stages at which sets are formed is highly
superdenumerable, that each of the stages corresponds
to an instant in the life of the constructive subject, and
that the subject’s activity is carried out in a medium
analogous to time, but far richter than time. (Call it
‘supertime’.) ... The view of the ideal subject as an
idealization of ourselves does not lapse when we release
the subject from the constraints of our time.
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Comparing Kitcher’s account of axiomatic set theory with his treat-
ment of arithmetic or intuitionistic mathematics, mathematical areas
can roughly be characterized by the degree of idealization, i.e. by
considering how remote the underlying operations are from our actual
capabilities. The agent working in ‘supertime’ mentioned in the quote
above seems to belong to a benchmark of idealization. As this is the
degree of idealization corresponding to set theory in Kitcher’s account,
we will refer to it as the ‘idealized agent of set theory’ from now on.3
Not unexpectedly, several issues with this approach can and have
been raised: E.g. about the ontological status of these idealized agents
(discussed in [4]), whether this degree of idealization still admits an ex-
planation of the applicability of mathematics, whether and how certain
large cardinals can be accomodated in this account etc. Nevertheless,
the imagination of an idealized agent or an idealized mental activity
seems to be in the background of large parts of mathematical under-
standing in one way or the other. In fact, there are numerous common
figures of speech in mathematical textbooks and even more in spoken
conversation that point to such (implicit) notions: For example, in
many proofs of the Bolzano-Weierstraß-theorem, ‘we’ are supposed to
‘pick’ a number from a subintervall containing infintely many elements
of a given sequence. One might find this problematic: In a naive sense,
of course, we cannot do this, as in general, we will not know which
intervall that is.4 However, this problem doesn’t seem to come up in
understanding this proof. In fact, agent-based formulations generally
seem to increase understanding and make constructions more imagin-
able rather than leading into conflicts with our factual limitations. A
similar observation holds for e.g. proofs of the well-ordering principle
from the axiom of choice, and in general for many uses of transfinite
recursion or transfinite induction. Another example would be the vari-
ous places in mathematical logic where constructions are explained by
interpreting them as transfinite ‘games’ between two ‘players’.
2.2. Degrees of idealization and the Church-Turing-Thesis. In
the Church-Turing-Thesis, recursiveness is stated to capture the intu-
itive meaning of ‘computable’. However, if the intuitive meaning of
‘computable’ is taken as ‘possible for a human being working without
understanding’, then literally, this is of course false: What we can actu-
ally do is very limited: In general, a recursive function is far away from
being computable by ‘a man provided with paper, pencil, and rubber,
and subject to strict discipline’ ([17]). But this fact is quite irrelevant
3Similar ideas are mentioned in other accounts on the philosophy of mathematics.
For example, in [19], S. 182, we find the following: ‘The overviewing of an infinite
range of objects presupposes an infinite intuition which is an idealization. Strictly
speaking, we can only run through finite ranges (and perhaps ones of rather limited
size only).’
4This is the reason why Bolzano-Weierstrass is intuitionistically invalid.
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for e.g. Hilbert’s 10th problem, which asks for a ‘finite’ procedure, not
a practical one. In the CTT , we are hence in fact facing a notion of an
idealized computing subject.
Usually, this idealization goes from certain factual bounds to ‘ar-
bitarily large, but finite’. But there seems to be a distinguished intu-
itive notion of computability going beyond this: For example, there is
little to no trouble with the idea of testing all even numbers for being
a sum of at most two primes. In fact, this thought experiment seems
to be at least part of the reason the Goldbach conjecture is generally
assumed to have a definite truth value. On the other hand, no such
intuition supports the idea of e.g. searching through V looking for a
bijection between R and ℵ1, not even if one assumes CH to have a def-
inite truth value.5 The idea of a transfinite systematic procedure for
obtaining certain objects or answering certain questions hence allows
for a clear distinction: Not every formulation that at the surface looks
like a ‘process description’ is eligible as an indication of a computation
of an idealized agent. Our goal is to find an exact characterization of
those procedures that are.
3. A model for idealized Agents
Even if one accepts that, beyond finiteness, clear degrees of idealiza-
tion of our activity can be concretely captured, the standard models
are not as canonical a model of it as e.g. Turing machines are in the
finite case. In the one direction, it does indeed seem plausible that
the actions of an OTM are available to a transfinite idealized agent
and that hence everything computable by an OTM should be com-
putable by such an agent: The aspects of an OTM-computation going
beyond classical computability consist in elementary limit operations
like forming the limes inferior of a sequence of 0s and 1s. But the other
direction is not as clear: For example, the limit rule of OTMs seems to
be rather arbitrary. The intuition here is that other reasonable choices
of limit rules will not change the class of computable objects, but it
is exactly the intuition leading there that we want to capture here.
We see no direct path from idealized agents to the standard models
known so far. Our approach is hence to develop a formal notion of a
transfinitely computing agent modelled after our intuition and then see
how it relates to the standard models. It turns out that it does indeed
describe the same notion of computability, which we consider a good
piece of evidence for our thesis.
The notion we are about to develop will be called Idealized Agent
Machines (IAMs). IAMs are meant to give a very liberal account
of the computational activity of idealized agents. In fact, one might
5Searching through L or its stages, on the other hand, seems again quite reason-
able, as L is canonically well-ordered.
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get the impression that what we model as a single step of an IAM is
really a series of lengthy sub-computations and that we are hence far
to generous in attributing abilities to our idealized agent. However,
we will demonstrate that even this liberal notion is equivalent to the
standard models. Therefore, we don’t need to claim that IAMs are a
very accurate model for the intuition of transfinite computations: we
only need it to be strong enough to include that intuition. We can then
argue that if such an intuition is really present - as we tried to show
above, then it is grasped by the standard models, as, in the end, we
will arrive at the following implications:
OTM-computable
=⇒
(1)
computable by the idealized agent of set theory
=⇒
(2)
IAM-computable
=⇒
(3)
OTM-computable
Here, implication (3), being a claim about two notions expressable in
the language of set theory, is provable (in ZFC) and implication (1) is
very natural (see above). It is step (2) that depends on the plausibility
of the analysis and modelling we are about to give.
An ideal computing agent works as follows: At each time, he has a
complete memory of his earlier computational activity. Also, he has
a working memory where he may store information. We assume that
the working memory consists of separate ‘places’, each containing one
symbol from a finite alphabet.6
The agent is working in according with instructions that determine
his activity. Certainly, any kind of operation that can be considered
an idealization of an activity we are actually capable of must be de-
scribable by finite means. We hence stipulate that the instructions are
given by some finite expressions. Based on the instructions, it must be
possible at each time to determine what to do (e.g. which new symbols
to write) on the basis of the computational activity so far.
We propose to model this in the following way: There should be a
first-order formula φ(x, y) such that, if the computational activity so
far is given by c and p is a place in the memory, φ(c, p, s) holds iff s is
the the symbol that should be written in place p after c. Here, it must
be possible to evaluate φ by mere inspection of c. Even if ‘inspection’
may be taken in an idealized sense here as well, this should certainly
mean that the appearing quantifiers should in some sense be ‘bounded’
by c. We will make this precise below.7
6The finiteness of the alphabet could in fact be dropped without changing the
class of computable functions we ultimately obtain. However, we consider this a
reasonable assumption for the notion we are about to model and hence decided
against taking the effort to demonstrate this.
7The choice of first-order logic might be objectional; we feel that e.g. second-
order logic would be inappropriate, for it would require the agent to have access to
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This description does not depend on any assumptions on the structure
of time. It is hence sufficiently general to yield a notion of transfinite
computability once an appropriate notion of transfinite time is intro-
duced.
3.1. Supertime and Superspace. In the passage quoted in the first
paragraph, Kitcher suggests that set theory can be considered as the
outcome of the mental activity of an idealized agent working in ‘a
medium analogous to time, but far richer than time’. Here, we want
to argue that the only sensible choice for such a medium are ordinals.
In his argumentation, it is also implicitely assumed that the agent not
only has a non-standard working time, but also the ability to ‘store’ the
outcome of his work, e.g., infinite memory or at least infinite writing
space. We will argue that it is natural and harmless to assume that
the writing space of an idealized agent is indexed by ordinals.
Certainly, we intend a notion of time as a medium of a deterministic
computation to be a linear ordering. But we can say more. The com-
putational activity has to start at some point. Every other state may
depend on this earlier state and hence has to take place at a moment
after the starting point. Hence, the ‘medium of computation’ has to
have a unique minimal element.
Whenever the agent has carried out a certain amount of computa-
tional activity, he has to know what to do next, i.e. there must be a
unique next state for him to assume. This next state has to take place
at some point of time. Hence, the medium in which he computes has to
contain a unique next element after those through which the activity
passed so far. Put differently: For every initial segment of time, there
has to be a unique time point preceeded by all moments in the initial
segment and only by those. This leads to the following notion of ‘su-
pertime’: A ‘supertime’ is a linearly ordered set8 (X,≤) with a unique
minimal element µ and such that, for every proper initial segment I of
X, there is a ≤-minimal xI ∈ X such that ∀t ∈ It < xI . It is now easy
to see that this means that all candidates for supertime are (isomorphic
to) ordinals:
Proposition 1. Let (X,≤) be a linearly ordered set such that, for
every I ( X which is downwards closed (i.e. x < y ∈ I implies x ∈ I),
there is a minimal xI ∈ X such that ∀t ∈ It < xI . Then (X,≤) is
isomorphic to an ordinal.
Proof. Note that ∅ is downwards closed in (X,≤) and let µ := x∅.
Obviously, µ is the unique minimal element of X.
an external notion of set which is not determined from his computational activity.
However, we are certainly interested in plausible alternatives and whether they
would turn out to lead to an equivalent notion of computability.
8The outcome might be different if one would allow ‘class time’. We don’t pursue
this further here.
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Let A ⊆ X. Consider the set Y := {x ∈ X|x < A}. It is easy to
see that Y is an initial segment of X. We claim that xY is a minimal
element of A.
To see that xY ∈ A, assume otherwise. As every element smaller than
xY is in Y and hence smaller than every element of A, it follows that
xY < A. But this implies xY ∈ Y , so xY < xY , a contradiction. So
xY ∈ A and every z < xY satisfies z /∈ A. Thus xY is indeed a minimal
element of A. As ≤ is linear, xY is unique with this property.
This implies that (X,≤) is a well-ordered set. Hence, it is isomorphic
to an ordinal. 
However, not all ordinals are suitable as such a medium: For exam-
ple, if our medium allows two procedures to be carried out, it should
also allow to carry out one after the other. Also, it should be possible
to have a procedure as a ‘subroutine’ of another to be repeatedly called
by the other. Finally, the class of ordinals itself provides an attractive
unification of appropriate computation times; hence we allow compu-
tations carried out without fixing a particular ordinal in advance.
Appropriate candidates for supertime hence turn out to be ordinals
which are closed under ordinal addition and multiplication and On it-
self. In the following, we will - for the sake of simplicity - focus on
the broadest case where the underlying time is On. Note that this no-
tion of supertime matches well with the way transfinite constructions
are commonly communicated and imagined: It is completely normal
to relate stages of such a construction by expressions coming from the
relation of time points and state that e.g. ‘earlier on, we made sure
that’. In fact, it is hard to talk about transfinite constructions avoiding
such expressions.
We imagine our agent to be equipped with a sufficient supply of place
for writing symbols. We assume that this space is partioned into slots
and that each slot is uniquely recognizable. There is a canonical well-
ordering on the set of used slots: Namely, each slot is at some point of
time used for the first time. Via this property, this slot is henceforth
identifiable. We may hence assume for our convenience that the slots
are indexed with ordinals from the very beginning: That is, the working
memory is at any time a function from some ordinal α into the set S
of symbols.9
Finally, even if we allow - as we will - several symbols to be re-
written in one step, an adequate model of computing time and space
should also impose some bounds on the space that can be actually
used after computing for τ many steps. We model this intuition by the
9This point could be strengthened by modelling space in a more general way
and then proving the resulting notion to be equivalent with the one obtained here.
However, this requires a cumbersome analysis and the gain in plausibility seems to
be too limited to justify it.
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extra condition that, at time τ , only slots with index in τ may contain
written symbols.10
3.2. Idealized Agent Machines. We will now describe a formal model
for the concept developed above. The instructions will be given by a
first-order statement in an appropriate language, which can be evalu-
ated on the basis of an initial segment of a computation.
We let Lc be the first-order language with equality, a binary function
symbol C(x, y) and a binary relation symbol ≤. The intended meaning
of C(x, y) = z is that, at time x, z is the symbol in the yth place, while
≤ is the ordering relation of ordinals.
If A is a finite set (the alphabet) and τ an ordinal, then a τ -state for A
is a function f : α → A, where α ≤ τ . We denote the class of τ -states
for A by SτA.
A function F with dom(F ) =: τ ∈ On and F (ι) ∈ SιA for all ι < τ
is called an A-τ -precomputation. For F an A-τ -precomputation, an
Lc-formula φ, ~s ∈ A
<ω, ~α ∈ (τ + 1)<ω, we define [φ(~α,~s)]Fτ , the truth
value of φ(~α,~s) in F , recursively (omitting the parameters where pos-
sible): [C(α, β) = x]Fτ = 1 if α < β or F (α)(β) = x, otherwise
[C(α, β) = x]Fτ = 0; [x ≤ y]
F
τ = 1 iff x, y ∈ On and x ≤ y, other-
wise [x ≤ y]Fτ = 0; [x = y]
F
τ = 1 iff x = y, otherwise [x = y]
F
τ = 0;
[¬φ]Fτ = 1 − [φ]
F
τ ; [φ ∧ ψ]
F
τ = [φ]
F
τ [ψ]
F
τ ; and [∃xφ(x)]
F
τ = 1 iff there is
ι ∈ τ such that [φ(ι)]Fτ = 1, otherwise [∃xφ(x)]
F
τ = 0.
An Lc-formula φ(x, y, z) is an IAM-program iff, for all τ ∈ On, α ≤ τ
and all A-τ -precomputations F , there is exactly one s ∈ A such that
[φ(τ, α, s)]Fτ = 1. If φ is an IAM-program, A a finite set, τ ∈ On and
F an A-τ -precomputation, then we define Sφ,τ,F : τ → A, the state of
the IAM-computation with φ at time τ after F , by letting Sφ,τ,F (α)
be the unique s ∈ A such that φ(F, α, s) holds for α < τ .
Furthermore, we define Iτφ, the τ -th initial segment of the IAM-computation
with φ at time τ , recursively by letting I0φ := ∅, I
τ+1
φ := {(τ, Sφ,τ,Iτφ)}∪I
τ
φ
and Iλφ :=
⋃
ι<λ I
ι
φ for λ a limit ordinal.
So far, our machines have no notion of halting. We therefore as-
sume that all our IAMs have a special symbol H in their alphabet.
The IAM-computation by φ is said to have stopped at time τ iff
Iφ,τ(τ)(0) = H, i.e. if the first symbol in the memory at time τ is
H.
An IAM-computation by φ will hence start with an empty tape and
then repeatedly apply the S-operator to obtain the next state, taking
unions at limits.
It is easy to see from the boundedness of the formula evaluated in
10This condition may seem to be too strict compared to the overall very liberal
model we set up. However, this choice is technically the least cumbersome; further-
more, we conjecture from our experience so far that every bound that is reasonably
explicit in τ will ultimately lead to the same class of computable functions.
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each step that this notion of computability is absolute insofar IAM-
computations are absolute between transitive models of ZFC. We can
also account for computations with a non-empty input and computa-
tions with parameters in these terms by adjusting the initial memory
content.
Definition 2. X ⊆ On is IAM-computable iff there exists an IAM-
program φ such that, for every α ∈ On, there is τ ∈ On such that, if
χα is the characteristic function of α in On and F = (0, χα), we have
Sφ,τ,F (0) = H and Sφ,τ,F (1) = 1 iff α ∈ On.
Similarly, f : On → On is IAM-computable iff there is an IAM-
program φ such that, for every α ∈ On, there is τ ∈ On such that
Sφ,τ,F (0) = H, Sφ,τ,F (f(α) + 1) = 1 and Sφ,τ,F (ι) = 0 for ι /∈ {0, f(α) +
1}, where again F = (0, χα) and χα is the characteristic function of α
in On.
We say that a set X ⊆ On or a function f : On → On is IAM-
computable from finitely many ordinal parameters iff there exists a
finite set p ⊂ On, an IAM-program φ using the alphabet A and an
a ∈ A such that φ computes X (or f , respectively) when the following
change is made for all τ < α ∈ On in the definition of the α-th state
Sφ,α,Iα
φ
: If β ∈ p, then Sφ,α,Iα
φ
(β) is set to a.
4. Idealized Agent Machines, ordinal computability and
the ICTT
Having developed our formal model for infinitary computations, it
is now rather straightforward to show that, in terms of computability,
it is equivalent to the standard models. As the elobarate versions are
quite long and cumbersome, we merely sketch the arguments here.
Lemma 3. (a) There is an Lc-formula φlim such that, for any precom-
putation F with dom(F ) = τ , we have [φ]Fτ = 1 iff τ is a limit ordinal.
Furthermore, the statement α = β+1 is expressable by an Lc-formulas
succ(α, β).
(b) Let A ⊂ ω be finite. There is an Lc-formula φliminf (x, y) such
that, for any τ ∈ On, a ∈ On, b ∈ A and any A-τ -precomputation F ,
[φliminf(a, b)]
F
τ holds iff b = lim inf ((F (ι))(a))ι<τ .
(c) Let P be an OTM-program, and let σ = (i, α, t) be a triple cod-
ing a state in the computation with P , where i is codes the current
state of the program, α the head position and t : τ → {0, 1} the
tape content. There are Lc-formulas φ
P
state(i, α, t, j), φ
P
head(i, α, t, β) and
φPtape(i, α, t, s) such, for any pre-computation F with dom(F ) = γ + 1,
[φstate(i, α, t, j)]
F
γ+1 = 1, [φ
P
head(i, α, t, β)]
F
γ+1 = 1 and [φ
P
tape(i, α, t, s)
F
γ+1 =
1 hold iff applying P in the state σ leads into the new state (j, β, t′),
where t′ : τ + 1 → {0, 1} is given by t′(α) = s and t′(ζ) = t′(ζ) for
ζ 6= α.
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Proof. (a) Take φlim to be ∀x∃y(x ≤ y ∧ ¬(x = y)). First assume that
τ is a
limit ordinal. Then [φlim]
F
τ = 1− [∃x∀y(¬(x ≤ y) ∨ x = y))]
F
τ . Now
[∃x∀y(¬(x ≤ y) ∨ x = y))]Fτ = 1 iff there exists x ∈ τ with [∀y(¬(x ≤
y) ∨ x = y)] = 1, which is equivalent to [¬∃y(x ≤ y ∧ x 6= y)]Fτ = 1 ↔
[∃y(x ≤ y ∧ x 6= y)]Fτ = 0, which means that there is no y < τ such
that [x ≤ y∧x 6= y]Fτ = 1, i.e. such that x ≤ y∧x 6= y holds. But such
an x obviously cannot exist if τ is a limit ordinal. The other direction
works in the same way, again by simply unfolding the definition of the
truth predicate. The second statement is similarly immediate.
(b) As A = {a1, ..., an} is finite, we can define ≤ on A by taking
a < b to be
∨
ai≤b
ai = a. Now take φ(a, b) to be ∃x∀z(x ≤ z =⇒ b ≤
C(z, a) ∧ ∀x∃z(x ≤ z ∧ C(z, a) = b).
(c) The required formulas are immediate from P and the fact that
limit ordinals are Lc-definable. To give an example, if P requires to
change from state i to state j1 when the symbol under the reading head
(at position α) is currently ι1 and to state j2 when the symbol is ι2, we
can express this through the Lc-formula
φi(α, j) ≡ ∃γ(((¬∃βsucc(γ, β) ∧ ((C(γ, α) = ∧j = j1) ∨ (C(γ, α) =
∧j = j2))). 
Theorem 4. Let f : On → On be OTM-computable. Then f is
IAM-computable.
Proof. Let P be an OTM-program for computing f . Suppose wlog that
P uses s ≥ 3 many states and put A := {0, 1, ..., s}. We will represent
states of the OTM-computation as sequences (ai|i ∈ α) where a0 ∈
{1, 2, ..., s} codes the inner state of the machine and the aι code the
tape content. Let bi = ai+1 for i ∈ ω and bι = aι otherwise. To express
the head position, we put bι = 2 if the ιth cell of the Turing tape
contains a 0 and the head is currently at position ι, bι = 3 if the ιth
tape content is 1 and the head is currently at position ι; otherwise, the
bι will just agree with the tape content.
Using the last lemma, one can now construct an Lc-formula φ such that
Iαφ represents the state and tape content of P at time α in the way we
described. 
Theorem 5. Let x ⊂ On be a set of ordinals. Then x is IAM-
computable from a finite set of ordinals iff it is OTM-computable from
a finite set of ordinals.
Proof. By [9], x ⊆ On is OTM-computable from finitely many ordinal
parameters iff x ∈ L. But it is not hard to see by adapting the theorem
above thatOTM-computations in finitely many parameters can be sim-
ulated by an IAM that hence every OTM-computable x is also IAM-
computable. On the other hand, as IAM-computations are definable
in L, every x IAM-computable from finitely many ordinal parameters
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must be an element of L. Hence the classes of IAM-computable sets
of ordinals and OTM-computable sets of ordinals both coincide with
the constructible sets of ordinals and hence with each other. 
Theorem 6. f : On→ On is IAM-computable iff it is computable by
an ordinal Turing machine (OTM) without parameters.
Proof. (Sketch) We saw above that an OTM can be simulated on an
IAM .
For the other direction, we indicate how to simulate an IAM by an
OTM . Let a finite A and an IAM-program φ be given.11 To see how
to emulate one computation step, assume we have safed the sequence
s := (sι|ι < τ) of IAM-states up to IAM-computing time τ so far on
an extra tape T1, separated by an extra symbol. The techniques from
[15] for evaluating the bounded truth predicate can then be adapted to
compute sτ on a second tape, using a third tape as a scratch tape. For
this, we compute, for each α ≤ τ , [φ(τ, α, s)]sτ for each s ∈ A until we
find the unique s¯ with [φ(τ, α, s¯)]sτ = 1, so that sτ (α) = s¯. Finally, we
copy sτ to the end of T1 to obtain a representation of (sι|ι < τ+1). 
This shows, up to our analysis in section 3 and the restriction to
working time and space On, that the intuitive concept of transfinite
computability coincides with OTM-computability. Hence, we can fi-
nally close this section by stating our candidate for an ICTT :
Infinitary Church-Turing-Thesis: A function f : On→ On is
computable by the idealized agent of set theory following a
deterministic rule iff it is computable by an OTM .
5. Conclusion and further Work
We have argued that there is an intuitive notion of transfinite com-
putability and that rendering it precisely leads us to a notion of trans-
finite computability equivalent with ORM- and OTM-computability.
Consequently, the constructible hierarchy was obtained as the realm of
this idealized activity. This suggests that these models indeed capture
some general intuitive concept and hence that results about these mod-
els can be interpreted as results about this notion. Accordingly, one
should expect interesting applications to general mathematics: For ex-
ample, one might consider measuring the complexity of an object or a
function by the computational ressources necessary to compute it. This
would give a precise meaning to the question whether certain objects
granted to exist by indirect proofs can be ‘concretely constructed’, even
11Note that a variant of an OTM working with finitely many symbols σ1, ..., σn
can be simulated by an OTM using only 0 and 1 by representing si as 0...0︸︷︷︸
n−i
1...1︸︷︷︸
i
.
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if this construction is allowed to be transfinite. In particular, it sug-
gests connections of transfinite computability to reverse mathematics
as exhibited in [11].
However, our argument has the drawback of being model-dependent:
We develop a certain notion of computability from the informal idea of
an idealized agent, hopefully along plausible lines. It would be prefer-
able to have a formal notion of transfinite computation not refering to
a particular model; this could be obtained by an appropriate axiom-
atization of transfinite computations similar to approaches that have
been made in the classical case. (See e.g. [1]. See also [10].)
Another question is whether a similar approach will work for other
models like e.g. ITTMs. This is likely to be more difficult, as our
coarse approach of approximating the activity of an idealized agent is
not available here: As it is shown in [3], there are natural alternative
choices for the limit rules that lead to larger classes of computable
functions.
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